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Foreword | This paper models the 
connection between the rate of terrorist 
events and the occurrence of counter-
terrorism interventions in order to 
examine the relative effectiveness of 
the interventions. Using data from the 
Global Terrorism Database and 
information on interventions collected by 
the authors, model results show that for 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, 
reactive types of interventions, such as 
arrests, indictments, imprisonments, 
assassinations and other operational 
activities show the strongest association 
with the rate of terrorism incidents over 
time. Maximum effectiveness—as 
measured by the number of days after an 
intervention exhibits its full inhibitory 
effect on the risk of subsequent terrorist 
attacks—was found to be greatest in 
Indonesia and the Philippines (11 days 
and 8 days respectively) and least 
effective in Thailand (impacting only on 
the day the intervention occurred). This 
paper also examines the number of days 
after an intervention that the response 
was able to maintain a high level of 
effectiveness—17 days in Indonesia, 13 
days in the Philippines and one day in 
Thailand. There were significant 
differences across these three countries 
and these results highlight a new 
approach to conceptualising the 
interaction between terrorism and 
counter-terrorism efforts.
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After the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, terrorism and 
counter-terrorism efforts moved to the front of popular consciousness and became the 
focus of national security for governments worldwide. With this increased attention came 
an urgent interest in understanding and identifying what works in fighting terrorism (Belasco 
2010). For Australia, understanding the relative effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts 
in nearby neighbours of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines is highly relevant for our 
country’s national security. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines are all countries that 
are important to Australia not just because of geographic proximity, but also because of a 
history of economic ties and the role these countries play as Australia’s regional partners.
Understanding the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts requires a conceptual 
framework for counter-terrorism interventions. The Australian National Counter-Terrorism 
Plan (NCTP) establishes a framework consisting of four categories of interventions—
Legislative and Administrative, Prevention and Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 
(NCTC 2005). These types of interventions all use theoretically different mechanisms to 
effect changes in patterns of terrorist activity, which it is proposed, require the development 
of different analytical tools for assessing the various types of interventions. This paper 
proposes a new analytic model for assessing the effects of Response category interventions 
(ie direct responses to terrorist activity or threats, such as arrests, convictions, or materiel 
seizures). These methods are applied to interventions in Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines for the period between 2000 and 2007. A database of counter-terrorism 
interventions categorised using the NCTP framework was created from a systematic search 
of open-source documents and the results were verified by subject area expert review.
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Figure 1 The three graphs (l–r) describe the effect on risk from attack, an intervention and their combined effect
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The use of a Hawkes process model to 
describe the clustering behaviour of terrorist 
activity is well-established (Porter & White 
2012; White, Poerter & Mazerolle 2012); this 
model was modified to include an additive 
inhibition term to describe the transient 
effects of Response-type interventions.
There are three principal hubs of terrorist 
activity in southeast Asia—Indonesia, 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in the 
Philippines, and the Malay-Muslim provinces 
of Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani in southern 
Thailand. These areas host a complex array 
of terrorist activity, executed by diverse 
groups who are motivated by a range of 
ideological and religious beliefs (eg see Chalk 
et al. 2009 for a detailed analysis). The broad 
strategic framework for counter-terrorism 
in these three countries differs significantly 
and is generally conditioned by assumptions 
regarding the root causes of violence in 
the respective countries. In the Philippines, 
terrorism is regarded mainly as an issue 
of poverty and economic marginalisation; 
hence, the thrust of mitigation has been 
directed at development assistance. In 
Indonesia, extremist violence is seen to be a 
product of subverted ideology. Accordingly, 
counter-measures have been largely aimed 
at disengagement using religious leaders 
and elders to discredit radical Islamic 
rhetoric. In Thailand, by contrast, the 
assumption is that radicalism emerges from 
a misunderstanding of the government’s 
efforts to foster a single, unified state based 
on cultural and religious assimilation, including 
loyalty to the monarchy and adherence to 
the Buddhist faith. In this case, the strategic 
measures for shaping remedial action have 
focused on ‘correcting’ Malay–Muslim 
perceptions through educational, economic 
and vocational training programs. While the 
broad thrust of strategic counter-terrorism 
in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
has differed according to specific national 
contexts, all three countries have instituted 
similar tactical intelligence, law enforcement 
and judicial responses or interventions to deal 
with the threats they have confronted. This 
paper examines the relative effectiveness 
of these operational counter-terrorism 
interventions in the three countries.
Indonesia
The Bali bombings of 2002 left 202 people 
dead and 209 seriously wounded (START 
2012), and are still considered some of the 
most serious acts of terrorism since the 
attacks of 11 September 2001. Prior to 
these bombings, the Indonesian Government 
largely dismissed concerns that it had a 
serious internal Islamist terrorism threat 
(Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). 
Following the attacks, the government 
could no longer ignore that there was a 
growing problem of terrorism in the country 
and issued two legal counter-terrorism 
regulations (Laws 15/2003 and 16/2003). 
The first empowered the police to detain 
terrorism suspects for up to six months 
before indictment and gave prosecutors 
and judges the right to block bank accounts 
belonging to individuals or organisations 
suspected of funding terrorist activities. The 
second, dealing specifically with the Bali 
attack, allowed the retroactive prosecution 
of those implicated in the bombings 
(Interviews with Indonesian officials, 
Jakarta, January 2008. All interviews 
were conducted in-country by Peter 
Chalk. By request, names of individuals 
and their affiliated organisations have not 
been noted to ensure confidentiality). In 
2006, the Indonesian Attorney General’s 
Department established a new Terrorism 
and Transnational Crime Task Force. 
Supported by US State Department funds, 
the Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task 
Force is primarily designed to help Indonesia 
cope with the increasing number of terrorist-
related trials in the post-2002 period (US 
Department of State 2007). In addition 
to these initiatives, substantial efforts 
were made to enhance and expand law 
enforcement counter-terrorism activity. One 
of the main developments was the creation 
of a dedicated national counter-terrorism 
Australian Institute of Criminology  |  3
unit, set up with multinational financial 
support. The unit is split into divisions 
that respectively focus on investigations, 
intelligence, logistical support and hostage 
rescue (Conboy 2008). In addition, 
provincial-level teams established in 2004 
have since spearheaded counter-terrorism 
efforts across the country (Haseman 2004). 
The government also moved to institute a 
national bomb task force (Conboy 2008). 
Finally, a number of changes took place 
in the domestic intelligence community. In 
2002, the then President issued a law that 
firmly established a National Intelligence 
Agency, Badan Intelijen Negara, as the 
focal point for coordinating national 
surveillance and monitoring activities 
across the country, including those 
falling under the auspices of the military. 
Two new intelligence schools were also 
established to train career-track analysts, 
and a Terrorism Eradication Coordinating 
Desk was set up to streamline counter-
terrorism cooperation among the police, 
army and intelligence communities (Conboy 
2004; Kingsbury 2003; Sebastian 2003). 
Despite this broad approach, Indonesia 
has not shied away from harder measures. 
At the forefront of these endeavours has 
been Detachment 88 (the National Police 
counter-terrorism unit), which has been 
deployed extensively to disrupt active 
terrorist cells and apprehend or otherwise 
eliminate cell members (Ng 2008; Schmitt 
2008). The unit has also sought to sever 
the links of prominent extremist groups with 
other smaller movements inside Indonesia, 
including entities that have sprung up in 
West and Central Java, North Sumatra and 
Sumatra (International Crisis Group 2011).
The Philippines
The thrust of Philippine counter-terrorism 
has fallen to the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines rather than the Philippine 
National Police (PNP). This runs counter 
to the approach in most liberal democratic 
countries, which view counter-terrorism 
as primarily a law enforcement task (Chalk 
1995). The PNP has played a secondary 
role in counter-terrorism for several 
reasons, including a legacy of suspicion 
of the police from their role in the Marcos 
era, a history of nepotism and corruption, 
a lack of continuity in leadership and a 
history of poor investigative techniques 
and an over-reliance on questionable 
confessions (Interviews, Australian and 
Philippine officials, Manila, January 2008). 
The weakness of and suspicion surrounding 
the PNP has, by default, thrust the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines into the forefront 
of Philippine counter-terrorism. The 
Marines, working with various Special 
Forces units, have led the fight against the 
main terrorist groups. The Marines have 
worked closely with the United States, 
which has provided assistance in the 
areas of operations intelligence fusion, unit 
interoperability, logistics and civil-military 
operations. This training is an integral 
feature of the so-called Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Philippines, which commenced in 
2002 following the Bali bombings and has 
since been coordinated under the auspices 
of the Joint US Mutual Assistance Group 
(Interviews, US and Philippine officials, 
Manila and Zamboanga, January 2010).
Figure 2 Terrorism incidents and interventions, Indonesia 2000–07
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Thailand
Counter-terrorism in Thailand has been 
heavily influenced by the state’s highly 
nationalistic character, which has historically 
paid little regard to regional diversity or 
autonomy. This reflects the acute sensitivity 
on the part of the central government 
to any challenge that might threaten the 
territorial integrity of the country, a normative 
perception that has entrenched assimilation 
rather than accommodation as the preferred 
means for dealing with potential centrifugal 
forces. As a result, Bangkok has dealt with 
counter-terrorism and political violence in 
its southern Malay provinces on the basis 
of the three pillars of Thai nation building—
monarchy (loyalty to the royal family), religion 
(Buddhism) and unity (political, economic 
and societal; Interviews, Thai academics, 
Bangkok and Pattani, September 2007). In 
line with its assimilationist view, Thailand’s 
counter-terrorism approach has largely 
aimed to forcibly contain separatist 
sentiment, while simultaneously trying to 
encourage Malay–Muslim acceptance 
of national assimilation. This involves the 
deployment of regular troops and elite units 
from the Royal Thai Army who have worked 
closely with special police shock squads 
trained in small-team tactics, long-range 
surveillance and hostage rescue (Interviews, 
Royal Thai Army officials, Bangkok and Yala, 
September 2007).
In addition, considerable emphasis has been 
given to creating irregular paramilitary forces 
and village-based self-defence militia. The 
former serves as a border patrol and light 
screening force, whereas the latter serves 
as a reserve capacity for the police. Both 
are viewed as a vital security ‘multiplier’ 
and they have increasingly assumed 
responsibility for the counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency burden in the southern 
Malay–Muslim provinces (Ball 2004; Ball 
& Mathieson 2007; International Crisis 
Group 2007; Interview, Royal Thai Army 
and Ranger officials, Pattani, September 
2007). In common with the PNP, the Royal 
Thai Police have not been major players in 
counter-terrorism activities in the south, with 
the exception of certain paramilitarised units. 
Like their counterparts in the PNP, they suffer 
from exceptionally poor forensic capabilities 
and an over-reliance on unsubstantiated 
confessions and eyewitness statements. 
Moreover, low pay rates have failed to 
attract high-calibre recruits and have 
encouraged institutional graft, which is now 
so endemic that the Royal Thai Police is one 
of the least respected of all of Thailand’s 
public services (Interviews, western officials 
and Thai academics, Bangkok, July 2008). 
Following the 2006 bloodless coup that led 
to the ousting of Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra, efforts have been made to 
improve the Royal Thai Army’s operational 
capabilities. This reform drive has been 
instituted as part of a general attempt to 
buttress hard-line counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency with a more nuanced 
policy mix of economic and dialogue 
initiatives (Chalk et al. 2009). However, 
experts such as Peter Chalk report that little 
progress has been made in Thailand on the 
twin emphasis on military containment and 
assimilation (Personal correspondence with 
Thai academics and western journalists, 
January–May 2011).
Figure 3 Intervention effects for Indonesia, The Philippines and Thailand
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Modelling the effectiveness of 
counter-terrorism interventions
Modelling conflict dynamics began in 
the early twentieth century with the 
development of a set of mathematical 
equations to describe the outcome of a 
conventional military engagement between 
two parties (Lanchester 1914; Ospiov 
1915). These equations incorporate a set 
of coefficients describing the ability of each 
side to inflict damage on the other and their 
respective attrition rates. The mathematics 
of this area of research (see also Richardson 
1960) form the basis for much of the 
analytical research in conflict and warfare 
(see also Lepingwell 1987; Taylor 1983). 
Sapperstein (2008) extends this concept to 
a similar set of equations that describe the 
interaction between terrorists and counter-
terrorism efforts. These approaches are 
similar to dynamic linear models used in 
other fields like ecology, for example, where 
they describe the dynamic relationships 
between predators and prey (West & 
Harrison 1997). The conflict dynamic 
framework adopted for this quantitative 
analysis extends the self-exciting model 
presented in Porter and White (2012), 
and White, Porter and Mazerolle (2012) 
to include an inhibitory effect based on 
counter-terrorism interventions. The self-
exciting model (Hawkes 1971a, 1971b) 
states mathematically that the occurrence 
of an event increases the probability of 
an event in the future, with the increase 
diminishing over time. The model presented 
here builds on this by assuming that 
counter-terrorism efforts have a similar 
inhibitory effect that tends to reduce the 
probability of future terrorist events, with 
this inhibition effect diminishing over time. 
Examining the fitted model parameters 
allows for a quantitative examination of 
the effects of a particular type of counter-
terrorism response on the overall risk, 
volatility and resilience of a population.
The application of the self-
exciting model to counter-
terrorism interventions
Data
Information on terrorist attacks collected 
from the Global Terrorism Database (LaFree 
& Dugan 2007) and the Institute for the 
Study of Violent Groups (www.isvg.org) 
was merged to create a comprehensive 
database of terrorist attacks that occurred 
from 2000 to 2007. Information on counter-
terrorism interventions was taken from the 
Counter-Terrorism intelligent Library (CTiL) 
(Mazerolle et al. 2011), a collection of 
open-source records of counter-terrorism 
responses in Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines occurring between 2000 and 
2007. The content of CTiL is categorised 
across four broad types of interventions, 
based on the Australian NCTP (NCTC 
2005), including Legal and Administrative, 
Prevention and Preparedness, Response 
Figure 4 Terrorism incidents and interventions, the Philippines 2000–07
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(including the arrest, trial, killing and/or 
imprisonment of terrorists, and the seizure of 
materiel) and Recovery. A stepwise selection 
procedure was used to select the most 
informative class of interventions. This was 
implemented as a generalised linear model 
(Nelder & Wedderburn 1972), with classes 
chosen to maximise the correlation between 
the number of incidents and interventions 
per year. The selection of yearly counts is 
meant to be a robust means of accounting 
for the variability in the relationship between 
different intervention types and the lag 
before their effects are felt. For example, 
arrests of terrorists could have a more 
immediate short-term effect on the number 
of incidents, while legislative or prevention 
efforts would most likely take more time to 
have an effect. This method was applied to 
each of the three countries in this study and 
showed that the Response category had 
the strongest association with the rate of 
terrorism incidents over time. These results 
guided the decision to focus the analysis 
on the Response class of interventions. 
A similar approach is presented in Dugan 
and Chenoweth (2012) using a non-
parameteric model.  The advantage in this 
case is the ability to directly compare the 
effects between contexts via the model 
parameter estimates.
The intervention effects model
The model for the intervention effects 
is written as a logistic model for pt, the 
probability, or the risk, of an attack on day t.
This model includes an annual trend. The 
functions g and h respectively describe 
the excitation effect of event history and 
the inhibition effect of intervention history. 
The combination of excitation and inhibition 
effects is illustrated in Figure 1. Model 
parameters are estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation. Results can be 
interpreted in terms of the duration and 
intensity of the intervention effects in order 
to assess the relative effectiveness of each 
country’s counter-terrorism efforts.
Results
The model results indicate a wide variety 
in the levels of effectiveness for counter-
terrorism interventions in Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand. While not 
conclusive, these results, when compared 
with expert assessments, give credence to 
the modelling framework presented.
Figure 5 Terrorism incidents and interventions, Thailand 2000–07
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Indonesia
Figure 2 shows the plot of the model-
estimated risk for Indonesia from 2000 
to 2007. Incidents are portrayed in black 
and interventions (responses) in red. The 
effectiveness of a response is indicated 
by the sharp decrease in risk immediately 
after the interventions are implemented. 
This is particularly evident post-2002, when 
the government moved to overhaul and 
enhance its counter-terrorism strategy 
following the first Bali bombing. As time 
progresses, the period between actual and 
attempted attacks becomes larger and the 
overall frequency of incidents decreases.
The solid line in Figure 3 shows a profile 
of the individual intervention effect for 
Indonesia. This represents the inhibition 
effect of a single counter-terrorism measure. 
The results show that the maximum impact 
of a response occurs after 11 days. By day 
17 the intervention has attained 95 percent 
of its expected impact. A key feature of the 
results for Indonesia is that responses occur 
close together, so that a new response 
intervention is implemented while a previous 
one is still having an impact. This approach 
seems to magnify the overall effectiveness 
of each new reactive response type of 
intervention, creating an overall effect much 
more powerful than if the same interventions 
had been implemented further apart.
The Philippines
Figure 4 shows the plot of the model-
estimated risk in the Philippines from 2000 
to 2007. The first noticeable differences 
between this country and Indonesia are the 
smaller number of response interventions 
and the higher overall risk. Although a 
drop in risk immediately follows most 
responses, there is a period between 2002 
and 2004 where the inhibitory effect of the 
response class of interventions seems to be 
negligible, if evident at all. During this time 
span, the temporal trend remains flat, with 
little overall reduction in the risk of actual 
or attempted terrorist attacks. Compared 
with Indonesia, the Philippines exhibits more 
local peaks of activity where risk is over 0.5; 
that is, there is a higher than 50 percent 
chance of a terrorist attack on any given 
day. In the seven year timeframe, there were 
four peak days such as these. This stands 
in contrast to Indonesia, which showed only 
two days when the terrorist attack risk was 
greater than 50 percent.
The broken line in Figure 3 represents the 
intervention effect profile for the Philippines. 
According to the model results, isolated 
response counter-measures are less effective 
than those in Indonesia. Counter-terrorism 
responses attained maximum impact eight 
days after being instituted, with the effect of 
the intervention being 95 percent complete 
by day 13.
Thailand
Figure 5 shows the plot of the model-
estimated risk for Thailand from 2000 to 
2007. The CTiL (Mazerolle et al. 2011) 
software recorded only four response type 
interventions for the country, each followed 
by an immediate and large dip in the risk 
of terrorist attack. However, the small 
number of interventions limits their overall 
effectiveness, reflected by the steady 
escalation in the rate of events during the 
time period. The results from this model 
ultimately point to inconclusive findings in 
assessing the effects of reactive response 
interventions in Thailand. The dotted line 
in Figure 3 displays the intervention effect 
for Thailand. Model results indicate that 
peak effectiveness is on day one after 
the response is instituted and reaches 95 
percent of the total impact by day two. The 
scarcity of data for Thailand does not allow 
for a valid comparison with the Philippines 
and Indonesia, other than to note that the 
steady increase in terrorist risk suggests 
the absence of an effective counter-
terrorism strategy.
Discussion
The analytical approach developed in this 
paper allows for a quantifiable assessment 
of one category of counter-terrorism 
interventions—responses to terrorist 
events—that can be used to inform national 
security policies and practices. It shows that 
the immediate effect of a response type of 
intervention (like arrest, capture, killing or 
imprisonment of terrorists) is likely to alter 
the risk of a subsequent terrorist event. This 
inhibitory effect of responses to terrorism 
is indicative of intervention effectiveness, 
although the model does not rule out 
the possibility of ‘blowback’ (ie negative 
effects that are opposite to the intended 
outcome). The model also demonstrates 
that interventions vary by type and their 
respective impacts, and are typically not 
constant over time. This is consistent 
with current expert interpretations and 
offers a more flexible and comprehensive 
means for examining the effectiveness 
of counter-terrorism interventions than 
is traditionally employed in terrorism 
research. It is clear from these results that 
Indonesia has instituted an effective suite 
of counter-terrorism responses that has 
reduced internal activity, while interventions 
in the Philippines and Thailand have not 
enjoyed similar success. These results 
suggest promise for adopting mathematical 
models for understanding the effectiveness 
of counter-terrorism measures, providing 
policymakers with a technique that can be 
usefully applied to other cases in other parts 
of the world. Future research will focus on 
expanding the model to include other classes 
of counter-terrorism interventions such as 
Legal/Administrative, Preparedness and 
Recovery. The authors also aim to refine the 
model to allow for its use as a predictive tool. 
These more complex simulation models will 
help determine the relative efficacy of both 
counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism measures 
and ultimately, the rational allocation of scarce 
national security resources.
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